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Damages for Loss of Future Earnings
in Personal Injury AwardsPennsylvania Locks Its "RevolvingDoor Approach"
Lawrence Evans Grant*
A.

Introduction

Today in Pennsylvania, persons recover money damages, assessed by a jury, for injuries sustained as the result of tortious conduct by others. Such damage awards may include compensation for
medical and other expenses,' loss of time and earnings, 2 physical'

and mental pain and suffering,4 loss of life's pleasures,' and loss of
earning capacity.6 Compensation for these various elements of dam-

ages by a jury, however, has not always existed in the history of our
procedure and jurisprudence.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently ended a swirl of
ever-changing rules and evidentiary requirements concerning damages for future loss of earnings in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz.7 Pennsylvania has now adopted what may be labeled a "total offset"

approach to the inflationary aspect of such future damages' and permits evidence of increased productivity regarding the victim's future
* Lawrence Evans Grant Associates, P.C., Paoli, Chester County, Pennsylvania; B.A.
1962, Temple University; LL.B. 1965, Temple University School of Law. Mr. Grant's practice
is exclusively limited to personal injury litigation.
1. See Baker v. Hagey, 177 Pa. 128, 35 A. 705 (1896); Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896).
2. See Glenn v. Philadelphia & West Chester Traction Co., 206 Pa. 135, 55 A. 860
(1903); Musick v. Latrobe Borough, 184 Pa. 375, 39 A. 226 (1898).
3. See Laurelli v. Shapiro, 416 Pa. 308, 206 A.2d 308 (1965); Thompson v. Iannuzzi, ,103
Pa. 329, 169 A.2d 777 (1961); McLaughlin v. City of Corry, 77 Pa. 109, 119 (1874).
4. See Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960); Studebaker v. Pittsburgh
Ry., 260 Pa. 79, 103 A. 532 (1918).
5. See Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960); Lebesco v. Southeastern
Pa. Transp. Auth., 251 Pa. Super. 415, 380 A.2d 848 (1977).
6. See Sherin v. Dushac, 404 Pa. 496, 172 A.2d 577 (1961); City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 400 Pa. 315, 162 A.2d 222 (1960).
7. 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980).
8. See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.

losses. 9

B. History ofAwardsfor Damagesfor PersonalInjuries
Early in the history of Anglo-Saxon common law, victims of
tortious conduct could not recover future damages for loss of earning
capacity.' 0 During this period, the practice of assessing damages, "of
finding a rational measure in money for a loss of injury not directly
connected with money," did not exist." Rather, courts awarded
damages for personal injuries under a state-established system of
money compensation for wrongs of violence to individuals.'" A
published schedule of payments, fixing the amounts to be paid the
victim for particular injuries, implemented the system.' 3 For example, the loss of an eye cost the tortfeasor fifty shillings, while a punch
in the nose yielded three shillings for the victim.' 4 The design of a
rigid system of awarding damages lessened the dispute over the
value of the actual injury sustained by the victim.'" As a natural
result, however, the system deprived fact finders [court or jury] of the
opportunity to use their judgment in assessing damages for the injury to the victim after evaluating the uniqueness of the injury and
the surrounding circumstances. 6 This system of redress for individual wrongs remained the method of recovering damages resulting
from tortious conduct through the Saxon era.' 7 Not until approximately 1200 A.D., more than one hundred years after the Norman
Conquest, did the practice of awarding damages by jury surface in
Anglo-Saxon law.' 8
The older authorities on damages agree that during the mid-tolate nineteenth century, courts recognized loss of earning capacity as
9.
10.

See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 5 (1935).

11.

Id.

12. Id. According to Professor McCormick, establishment of the state-established system
constituted a "step in the gradual substitution of judicial redress for the vengence of the blood
feud." Id. at 22.
13. Id. A similar system of scheduling monetary payments for particular physical injuries exists in the present Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. This Act provides for
example, that employees elibigle to receive workmen's compensation benefits shall receive
sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of their wages for three hundred and thirty-five weeks for
the loss of a hand, and sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of their wages for two hundred and
seventy-five weeks for the loss of an eye. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 513(l), (7) (Purdon 1974)
(as amended).
14.

MCCORMICK, supra note 10 at § 5. "The Anglo Saxon laws which fixed the [prices to

be paid for various injuries were] expressed in terms of money, but the actual payment was
ordinarily made by delivering cattle or goods at valuations established by custom." Id. at 23

n.2.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at § 5.
18. Id. Commentators estimate that this practice paralleled in emergence the practice by
English Courts of using juries. Id. Professor McCormick has noted that from the beginning of
this practice of awarding damages, juries at times were called upon to assess them. Id.

an element of future damages for injuries to the person.' 9 These authorities rationalized such a rule by characterizing this element of
damages as a natural consequence or result of the plaintiff's injuries
inmany cases for which the plaintiff deserved compensation.20
The earliest Pennsylvania decision acknowledging this rule,
Laing v. Colder,2 ' an 1848 case, held that a plaintiff may recover
damages for loss of "capacity to labour" that results from the negligence of the defendant.2 2 Subsequent Pennsylvania cases further defined and firmly established this Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision as an element of damages for injuries to the person. 23 In
Baxter v. Phi/ade#phia& Reading Railway Company 24 the court defined earning capacity as "that [value] resulting from the intellectual
2

or bodily labor of the injured party in his business or profession."
Baxter rejected the use of any profits that the plaintiff could derive
from invested capital or the labor of others as an element of damages
for loss of earning capacity. 26 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has
held that the applicable standard of damages for loss of earning capacity is the injured person's ability to earn wages in any kind of
employment for which he qualifies. 27
19.

See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 86, at 299-309; J. JoYcE, I A TREATISE ON DAM-

AGES § 227, at 277-79 (1903); F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF REMEDIES FOR TORTS 580 (2d Ed.

1873); T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 654 n.l (4th ed. 1858).
In England, cases dating to the middle of the nineteenth century similarly recognized loss
of earning capacity as an element of damages for personal injuries. See Phillips v. London &
S.W. Ry., 4 Q.B.D. 78 (1879) (plaintiff should receive damages for loss of capacity to labor
over the plaintiff's expected term of life not considering injury); Armsworth v. South Eastern
Ry., II Jur. 58 (1857), citing
v.
, 18 Q.B. 104 (1857) (disability from future exertion
and consequent pecuniary loss are grounds for damages). But see Harris v. Bright's Asphalt
Contractors, 1 All. E.R. 395 (1953) (damages for loss of earning capacity are recoverable only
over the plaintiff's expected term of life considering injuries).
20. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. 8 Pa. 479 (1848).
22. Id. at 481-82. In Laing, the issue of loss of earning capacity as an element of damages for personal injury arose during the court's discussion of the necessity of general and
special pleading of various elements of damages in personal injury cases. The court concluded
that plaintiffs must plead loss of earning capacity as an element of damages, specially because
it has no "necessary connexion [sic] with the injury done to the person." Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Sherin v. Dushac, 404 Pa. 496, 172 A.2d 577 (1961); City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 400 Pa. 315, 162 A.2d 222 (1960); Kmiotek v. Anast, 350 Pa. 593 39 A.2d
923 (1944); Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896); Lake Shore & M.S.
Ry. v. Frantz, 127 Pa. 297, 18 A. 22 (1889); Scott Township v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. 444 (1880).
In Goodhart v. The Pennsylvania R.R., the court noted the following:
[L]oss of earning power is not always easy of calculation. It involves an inquiry into
the value of the labor, physical or intellectual, of the person injured, before the accident happened to him, and the ability of the same person to earn money by labor,
physical or intellectual, after the injury was received.
177 Pa. 1, 15, 35 A. 191, 193 (1896).
24. 264 Pa. 467, 107 A. 881 (1919).
25. Id. at 472, 107 A. at 883.
26. Id.
27. Weinstock v. United Cigar Stores Co., 137 Pa. Super. 128, 8 A.2d 799 (1939).

C

Rules SurroundingLoss of Earning Capacity as an Element of
Future Damages

L The Present Value Rule. -In Pennsylvania, judicial rules affecting loss of earning capacity as an element of future damages began to surface soon after the courts' recognition of such an element.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted one of the most important of the future damages rules in the 1896 decision, Goodhart v.
Pennsylvania RailroadCompany. " In Goodhart, plaintiff brought an
action in trespass for personal injuries against defendant Pennsylvania Railroad Company for injuries sustained when he was
thrown from his train seat during a collision with another train. u9 In
discussing the measure of future payments as damages for loss of
earning capacity, the enlightened court embraced the present value
rule in holding that "[w]hen future payments are to be anticipated
and capitalized in a verdict, the plaintiff is entitled only to their present worth."3 The court rejected as "clearly wrong" the legal principle of damages that an award for loss of future earning capacity
should equal an amount with which the plaintiff could go out into
the market and purchase an annuity at the time of the verdict that
would provide him with a flow of payments, the sum of which would
amount to his estimated future earnings. 3 The court adopted the
rule that the plaintiff should receive thepresent worth of his damages
for loss of future earning capacity.32 The present worth represents
the amount of money at the verdict date that, when added to the
amount earned on the investment of such money over the period
covering the future payments, would equal the plaintiff's total estimated future yearly earnings calculated at the verdict date.33 The
applicability of the present value rule to future damages for loss of
earning capacity thus became firmly established in Pennsylvania.34
28. 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896).
29. Id. at 12-13, 35 A. at 192.
30. Id. at 17, 35 A. at 193. The court went no further in attempting to define this present
worth rule that it adopted.
31. Id. The jury at trial awarded the plaintiff a sum equal to the cost of an annuity of a
per annum sum for a certain period of years. Id. The court rejected this as the legal valuation
of future damages for loss of earning capacity notwithstanding that this method compares to
the present value rule in that they both award the plaintiff a lesser sum than the aggregate of
his expected earnings over his expected future period of productivity.
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the present value rule, see McCORMICK, supra note 10, at 304-09
(1935); Miller,Assessment of Damagesin PersonalInjuryActions, 14 MINN. L. REV. 216 (1930).
34. See Messer v. Beighley, 409 Pa. 551, 555, 187 A.2d 168, 170 (1963); James v. Ferguson, 401 Pa. 92, 96, 162 A.2d 690, 692 1960); Kmiotek v. Anast, 350 Pa. 593, 599, 39 A.2d 923,
926 (1944); Littman v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 315 Pa. 370, 388, 172 A. 687, 690 (1934); Reitler v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 238 Pa. 1,7, 85 A. 1000, 1002 (1913); Wolf v. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co.,
236 Pa. 240, 245, 84 A. 778, 779 (1912); Bockelcamp v. Lackawanna & Wyo. Valley R.R., 232
Pa. 66, 71, 81 A. 93, 95 (1911). In Litman, the court formulated its first definition of "present
worth":

Subsequent to the adoption of the present value rule by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Goodhart, and its establishment in
Pennsylvania law during the 1900s, the court further defined the rule

in Windle v. Davis. 35 The Windle court held that when the jury computes future damages at their present worth, they must use a six percent "interest" or "discount" rate. 6 In so holding, the court
reasoned that some legal standard must guide the jury when they
performed the "important" duty of assessing future damages
through present value calculations. 3" Although not indicated by the

court, a close reading of the opinion indicates that a difficult present
value calculation, the possible existence of jurors not educated
enough in the areas of business and arithmetic to appreciate the
mechanics of the calculation, and the undesirability of varied and
inconsistent interest rates being applied in present value calculations
motivated the adoption of the six percent rule.3 8
[Piresent worth. . . [is] a sum which if paid on the date of the verdict would then be
a just cash equivalent of the sum total of such lost future earnings. The award for
permanent impairment of earning power must not exceed, though it should equal, the
worth at the date ofthe verdict, of a sum payable in normal future installments during
what would be the period of the injured person's ability to earn money had he not
received the injury or injuries complained of. This sum would be made up by adding
the money losses the injured person will sustain from year to year or month to month
by reason of such impairment of his ability to earn money, during the reasonably
expected duration of his life's future earning period.
315 Pa. 370, 377, 172 A. 687, 690 (emphasis in original).
Other state courts have widely accepted the "present worth rule." See, e.g., Palmer v.
Security Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N.W. 677 (1928); Rigley v. Pryor, 290 Mo. 10, 233 S.W.
828 (1921); Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643 (1952). For a thorough
compliation of state law holdings on this issue, see 25 C.J.S. Damages § 87(e) (1966).
35. 275 Pa. 23, 118 A. 503 (1922). Windle involved a suit by a seventeen year old boy
and his mother to recover damages for injuries sustained by the boy when he was struck from
behind by a train owned by the defendant. Id. at 25-26, 118 A. at 503-04. The accident occurred while the boy was walking along the tracks on a platform. Id. at 26, 118 A. at 506. The
train knocked the boy down and crushed his right leg. Id.
36. Id. at 29, 118 A. at 505). Before 1974, Pennsylvania statutory law provided that:
"The lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money in an amount of less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), in all cases where no express contract shall have been made for a less
rate, shall be six percent per annum ..
" 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3 (Purdon 1958) (as
amended 1970). In 1974, however, the legislature repealed this statute. Pennsylvania law currently provides that:
[R]eference in any law or document enacted or executed heretofore or hereafter to
"legal rate of interest" and reference in any document to an obligation to pay a sum
of money "with interest" without specification of the applicable rate shall be construed to refer to the rate of interest of six percent per annum.
41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 202 (Purdon 1974).
37. 275 Pa. at 29, 118 A. at 505.
38. This conclusion derives from both the court's citation of portions of the trial court's
instructions to the jury on damages and its comments on those instructions. The court noted
that the trial court instructed the jury, in part, that if they decided not to use present value
calculations presented by an expert witness at trial in their deliberation of damages, they could
"'make [their] own present value calculations in [their] own way and to [their] own satisfaction.'" Id. The court determined that "it was misleading" for the trial court to so instruct. Id.
In addition, the court stated:
A jury must compute damages accordingto law, not merely to their own satisfaction,
and when passing upon the question of future damages they can allow, as the present
worth, such sum only as put at simple interest will, with the accumulations of interest,

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the six percent rule in subsequent decisions, accompanying dissents sharply
criticized the rule. In Murray v. Philadelphia Transportation Company,39 a majority of the court required reductions of awards to
plaintiffs for compensation for loss of earning capacity to their present worth at the legal interest rate of six percent, as mandated in
Windle.40 Justice Stern, with great perspicacity, concluded in a dissenting opinion that the court should scrap the six percent rule in
favor of a rule allowing the jury to consider the "current rate of return on sound investment" when reducing future damages to present
worth." To support this conclusion, Justice Stern elucidated his perception of both the rationale underlying the six percent rule and the
effects of the rule. He stated that there was no "logical connection
whatever between the maximum rate of interest which the law allows
a creditor to charge [six percent rule] and the amount of return
which an investor can obtain on reasonably safe securities."42 Justice Stern discussed the effects of the six percent rule, noting that "it
sharply diminishes the amount recoverable no matter which rule as
to the measure of damages [is]

. .

. adopted," and that it unrealisti-

cally assumed that damages recovered can be "safely invested on the
43
basis of a 6%return.
In Sherman v. ManufacturersLight andHeat Company," Justice

Musmanno, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Arnold, argued
that the majority had a duty to overrule the "outdated" six percent
rule of Windle v. Davis. 45 In fact, the majority declared it "unneces-

sary" to even address the six percent rule issue.4 6 Justice Musmanno
amount to such damages at the time or times in the future when the jury finds from
the evidence they will be sustained.
Id. (emphasis added).
39. 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323 (1948). In Murray, the parents of an infant brought a wrongful death action against the defendant for hitting the infant with his car as the child crossed a
Philadelphia street. Id. at 70, 58 A.2d at 323. The defendant appealed the jury award of
$15,000 for the plaintiffs and sought a new trial. Id. On appeal, a new trial was granted. Id.
at 76, 58 A.2d at 326.
40. Id. at 74 n.7, 58 A.2d at 325 n.7 (citing Windle v. Davis, 275 Pa. 23, 29, 118 A. 503,
505 (1922)).
41. Id. at 79 n.2, 58 A.2d at 328 n.2 (Stem, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 924 comment d (1938)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 389 Pa. 61, 132 A.2d 255 (1957). In Sherman, the plaintiff brought an action of trespass for personal injuries to recover for back injuries sustained when the defendant's truck
collided with the plaintiff's automobile. Id. at 62, 132 A.2d at 256. The jury rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff for $22,000. Id. The plaintiff appealed for a new trial because of alleged
errors in the charge of the court and because of the verdict's inadequacy. Id. The trial court
refused the new trial and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. Id. at 62,
69, 132 A.2d at 256, 260.
45. Id. at 70, 132 A.2d at 260 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Justice Musmanno stated that
the court "should retire Windle v. Davis because it proclaims a financial criterion which has
long ago been repudiated on the Rialto." Id.
46. Id. at 69, 132 A.2d at 260. In his appeal, the plaintiff specifically alleged that the trial

concluded that a damage award for prospective loss of earning capacity should be reduced by the "prevailing rate of interest" in determining its present worth.47 He noted that the Great Depression of
1929, which occurred seven years after the Windle decision sharply
curtailed the earning power of money on safe investments below six

percent,48 and that the average plaintiff in a personal injury case
does not possess the "exceeding financial skill or extraordinary luck
to produce a 6% ipsofacto return on a given investment. '49 Justice
Musmanno further noted that by imposing the six percent rule on
plaintiffs, the courts effectively take from them a portion of the damages the law has awarded them, because the damages are discounted
by six percent while they actually earn only a two or three percent
safe return in the marketplace.5 0 Further, Justice Musmanno regarded it a "strange and enigmatic" form of justice to turn around
and award this portion taken from the plaintiffs to the guilty party,

the defendant, by reducing the amount of damages he must pay.'
Justice Musmanno again voiced his criticism of the six percent
rule in Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Company. 2 In Grego-

rius, a majority of the court followed and reaffirmed the six percent
rule of Windle. " The majority essentially echoed the rationale of
Windle, 1 4 and concluded that in light of the volatility of interest

rates in amounts and over varying places and times, "[t]here must be
a fixed rule to aid juries in calculating the present worth of [future]
judge erred in instructing the jury to apply the six percent rule in reducing damages to present
worth. Id.
47. Id. at 71, 132 A.2d at 261.
48. id. at 70, 132 A.2d at 260. In discussing the effects of the Depression on the value of
money, Justice Musmanno stated:
There was a time, of course, when money was a very lively plant in a fertile soil. It
only had to be watered with reasonable care and it would bloom with 6% and even
higher rates of interest. In 1929 that plant suffered a blight from which it never thoroughly recovered. To speak today of 6% on bank deposits and other guaranteed, safe
investments is to indulge in day-dreaming.
Id.
49. Id. Justice Musmanno added that it is not "in keeping with our concept of fair dealing to subject [the plaintiff] to the law of chance in obtaining what is his by operation of the
law of the land." Id.
50. Id. at 70-71, 132 A.2d at 260. Justice Musmanno premised this conclusion on the fact
that plaintiffs will realize only the prevailing market rate of interest on their investment of the
damages received. Id. at 70, 132 A.2d at 261. According to Justice Musanno, this market
interest rate would most likely equal 2 or 3% Id.
51. Id. at 70-71, 132 A.2d at 260.
52. 409 Pa. 578, 187 A.2d 646 (1962). In Gregorius, the plaintiff brought an action in
trespass for personal injuries sustained when the platform on which he was painting snapped,
causing him to fall to the ground and sustain permanent injuries. 1d. at 581-82, 187 A.2d at
647-48. The platform, supplied by the defendant, was held defective. Id. at 582, 182 A.2d at
648. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff a substantial verdict of $210,675. Id. at 580, 187
A.2d at 647. The court directed a new trial limited to the question of damages. Id. On appeal
by the plaintiff from this order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 586, 187
A.2d at 650.
53. Id. at 584-85, 187 A.2d at 649-50. For a discussion of the six percent rule enunciated
in Windle, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.

. . . damage[s] and to guide trial courts in aiding the jury in resolving such difficult questions." 5 In his dissent, Justice Musmanno resumed his stalwart crusade against the six percent rule that had
begun in Sherman v. ManufacturersLight andHeat Company. 6 In a

detailed and lengthy opinion, he further criticized the six percent
rule as one that is "palpably incorrect and clearly works injustice." 7
As in Sherman, Justice Musmanno initially noted that the Depres-

sion's effect of reducing the earning power of safely invested money
converted the once acceptable six percent rule into one that "no
longer represent[s] reality." 8 He then addressed the majority's statement of the rule and the majority's underlying rationale. In response
to the majority's characterization of the six percent rule as integrating the "lawful" rate of interest,5 9 Justice Musmanno concluded that
Pennsylvania and federal laws which establish interest rates at three
to five percent indicate that the six percent interest rate is "really
unlawful."6 He also observed that given the average juror's

financial knowledge, the majority incorrectly feared that a change in
the rule would lead to "chaos," "confusion," and "greater difficulty
in the trial" of cases. 6 ' Finally, he cited various jurisdictions, includ55. 409 Pa. at 585, 187 A.2d at 650. The majority further stated that "[i]t is our conclusion that a change [from the six percent] rule would lead only to confusion and chaos and add
greater difficulty in the trial of such cases." Id. The plaintiff argued that current economic
conditions rendered the six percent rule antiquated and unrealistic. Id.
56. Id. at 580, 187 A.2d at 650 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Sherman decision, see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
57. 409 Pa. at 589, 187 A.2d at 651 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 587, 187 A.2d at 650. Justice Musmanno stated that "Ie]veryone knows that
obtaining a return of 6% on one's money today is like growing watermelons in the Sahara. It is
possible but highly unlikely, without the aid of experts whose cost could drain away the profit,
making the venture a wholly dessicated investment." Id. (emphasis added). Justice Musmanno continued:
The lower court's opinion and the majority opinion speak of a 6% return on investments as if the 6% flag were flying over every bank, building and loan association and
broker's establishment. As a matter of fact that flag has been at half mast for many
years and for a long time following the crash of 1929 it scarcely got above the roof
and for years could not manage to reach higher than a third of the way to the top of
the flagpole.
Id. at 588, 187 A.2d at 651. Interestingly, Justice Musmanno also cited post-Depression Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, in a different factual context, that directly conflicted with
the six percent rule's assumption of the earning power of money. Id. at 587, 187 A.2d at 651
(quoting Kenin's Trust Estate, 343 Pa. 549, 566, 23 A.2d 837 (1942) (judicial notice taken of the
fact that invested money cannot safely yield a return of 6% a year, but, rather, no more than
2 % a year)).
59. 409 Pa. at 585, 187 A.2d at 649.
60. Id. at 590, 187 A.2d at 652. Justice Musmanno noted that banks insured under the
Federal Reserve System may pay no more than 3% interest, compounded quarterly. Id. Also,
he noted that savings banks, whether insured under the Federal Reserve System or not, may
not pay depositors over 5% interest in Pennsylvania. Id.
61.
d. at 589-90, 187 A.2d at 652. Justice Musmanno stated:
Jurors are more aware of what is happening in the current world than the majority
gives them credit for. With the media of mass communication prevalent todaynewspapers, radio television, billboards--all of which proclaim the rates of interest
payable by banks and investment houses, the average juror more thoroughly knows
what is happening in the world of finance than even bankers could constantly know
when the Windle case broke on the horizon of an uninformed public.

ing the United States Supreme Court, that had rejected the six percent rule in favor of one that applied the rate of interest available on
safe investments.62
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the six percent rule issue since Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Company. 63 In Brodie, a majority of the court affirmed the six percent
rule,' with Justice Roberts dissenting.65 Justice Roberts felt that
present worth should be determined without the requirement of the
six percent rule. Thus, he asserted his belief that a six percent interest return is not "commonly available" for such funds when invested.66 Instead, Justice Roberts concluded that courts should
employ the prevailing rate of interest, established by proof, in reducing future damages to present worth.67
has
The recent decision in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 68 however,
69
mooted this issue previously subject to so much discussion.
2. Admissibility of Present Value Tables.-Since

the beginning

of this century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often discussed
the admissibility into evidence of present value annuity tables that
show the present value of a dollar payable annually at a fixed future
date. Since the court first held the tables inadmissible evidence, it

has expressly or impliedly changed its position no fewer than four
times.
Id. at 590, 187 A.2d at 652.
62. Id. at 592-94, 187 A.2d at 653-54 (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S.
485,490 (1916) (compensation should be awarded upon the basis of such interest rate that does
not call upon the beneficiaries to exercise financial skills, not necessarily the "legal rate" of
interest)); Renuaert Lumber Yards v. Levine, State, 49 So. 2d 97, 98 (1950) (better rule does
not restrict the jury to the legal rate of interest but, rather, leaves jury to apply such rate as it
finds to be just and fair under the circumstances); Von Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115,
122, 99 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1959) (rate for safe investments in the locality should be used in
reducing loss of future earnings to present value, not the legal rate of interest); In Thornis v.
Pounsford, 210 Minn. 462, 299 N.W. 16 (1941) (ordinarily the computation of damages should
be based on the rate of interest available on safe investments); Adams v. Severance, 93 N.H.
289, 298, 41 A.2d 233, 239 (1945) (average current rate according to standard investment practices should be used); Kellerher v. Porter, 29 Wash. 2d 650, 676, 189 P.2d 223, 236 (1948) (jury
should use as discount factor the rate that could fairly be expected from safe investments
which a person of ordinary prudence could make in the locality.
63. 415 Pa. 296, 203 A.2d 657 (1964).
64. Id. at 300, 203 A.2d at 659. For a discussion of this case, see, infra notes 99-106 and
accompanying text.
65. 415 Pa. at 303, 203 A.2d at 660 (Roberts, J., dissenting). For some reason, no formal
dissenting opinion was printed. The text of the case contains only a brief synopsis of Justice
Roberts' holding and rationale on the six percent rule issue. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Recent Pennsylvania Superior Court cases have upheld and applied the six percent rule of Windle in reducing future damages for loss of earning capacity to present worth.
See Wright v. Engle, 256 Pa. Super. 321, 325, 389 A.2d 1144, 1146 (1978); Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 220 Pa. Super. 455, 458, 289 A.2d 166-67, (1972); Troncatti v. Smereczniak, 210
Pa. Super. 329, 333, 231 A.2d 886, 889 (1967).
68. 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980).
69. See infra notes 119-148 and accompanying text.

In 1899, in Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,7" the
court first addressed the issue. In Kerrigan, the plaintiff brought an
action in trespass for personal injuries to recover future damages for
loss of earning capacity against the defendant railroad company for
its negligence in leaving a hole exposed between two railroad ties.7'
The plaintiff fell into the hole while working, and injured his right
arm, which later required amputation.7 2 The court held that the trial
court erred in admitting a present value annuity table in a personal
injury case.73 The court reasoned that, because of the purely mathematical nature of the calculations in the tables, the tables disregarded factors such as age, health, and ability to earn. These factors
could reduce the amount of future annual income the plaintiff would
have earned over his expected lifetime, and, consequently, overstated the amount of damages that a jury would award for loss of
future income.74 The court noted that the tables rest on the erroneous assumption that "the plaintiff is entitled to enough money down
with which he may purchase an annuity for the remainder of his life,
and enjoy the same annual sum at sixty or sixty-five as at twentytwo." 75
The rule enunciated in Kerrigan continued until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of present value
annuity tables into evidence again seventeen years later. In
Seeherman v. Wilkes-Barre Company,76 the court permitted the use
of present value annuity tables when the parents of a boy sued an
electric company for the negligent maintenance of a transformer that
caused the boy's death when he operated a connecting electrical
switch." The court, in addressing the damages recoverable by the
parents, admitted annuity tables showing the present value of a series of payments of one dollar payable through the required number
of years to determine the measure of value of the son's lost future
earning capacity during his minority. 8 The court reasoned that such
tables provided the jury with a readily ascertainable source for calculations of the present worth of sums of money receivable in the
future.79 The court further supported its holding by noting its con70. 194 Pa. 98, 44 A. 1069 (1899).
71. Id at 101-02, 44 A. at 1069.
72. Id at 102, 44 A. at 1069.
73. Id at 106-07, 44 A. at 1071.

74. Id In discussing the tables, the court stated that "Is]uch a table is based on the
average anticipation of death, without taking account of capacity to work, indolence, vicious
habits, or a tendency thereto, or dimunition of ability to earn." Id The court continued:
"The health, earning power and industry of the particular individual have no place in such a
[purely mathematical] ... calculation." Id
75. Id at 1077, 44 A. at 1071.
76. 255 Pa. II, 99 A. 174 (1916).
77. Id at 13, 99 A. at 175.
78. Id at 16-17, 99 A. at 176.
79. Id at 17, 99 A. at 176.

temporaneous use of life expectancy tables which, according to the
court, were of the same "character."" °
Three years later, in Faber v. Gimbel Brothers,8 the court again
addressed the issue of the admissibility of present worth tables into
evidence. In Faber,the plaintiff sued to recover damages for, among
other things, partial impairment of his future earning capacity sustained after being struck by defendant's truck.8 2 The court extended
the holding of Seeherman8 3 to cases of partial disability of earning
capacity and held that, in such situations, present value tables were
admissible to determine the present value of a jury award of damages to a plaintiff.84 The court rejected any distinction between findings of total and partial impairment of earning capacity as affecting
the admissibility of the present worth tables.85 In so concluding, the
court noted that the tables became relevant only after the damage
award for loss of earning capacity had been computed by considering various factors including, but not limited to, the extent of loss of
earning power, the length of time the impairment of earning power
will probably continue, and the depreciation of earnings by reason of
aging.86 Then the court applied the tables in the light of the jury
determination of the length of time the impairment of earning power
assistance in
would exist.87 This afforded the jury mathematical
88
award.
damage
the
of
value
present
the
computing
The use of present value tables as evidence to assist the jury in
the determination of future damages for loss of earning capacity enjoyed short-lived acceptance. In 1926, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reexamined this issue in McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 89 and ex80. Id The court also noted that proof of the present value annuity tables could be made
in a manner similar to that in which the life expectancy tables were placed in evidence. Id
81. 264 Pa. 1,107 A. 222 (1919).
82. Id at 3-4, 107 A. at 222.
83. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
84. 264 Pa. at 4-5, 107 A. at 223.
85. Id at 4, 107 A. at 223. The court noted that no adequate reason was given for making the distinction, and, on principle, none appeared. Id at 4-5, 107 A. at 223. The defendant
apparently argued that the court should not have admitted present value tables into evidence
because they showed the present value of sums of money received periodically over a person's
life expectancy or period of total incapacity, when in fact the plaintiff was found at trial to be
only partially incapacitated in earning power. See id at 4, 107 A. at 223.
86. 264 Pa. at 5, 107 A. at 223.
87. Id In response to the defendant's argument, see supra at note 85, the court noted that
this time of impairment may or may not equal the plaintiff's life expectancy. Id Therefore,
the number of years from the present value tables used by the jury in determining the present
value of sums receivable over those years as potential earnings may differ from the number of
years found on the mortality tables. Id
88. Id The court found that the tables afforded the jury relevant and accurate assistance
in determining otherwise tedious present value calculations. Id Other Pennsylvania cases
during this period supported the admissibility of the present value tables into evidence. See
Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428, 434, 109 A. 666, 668 (1920); Fletcher v. Wilmington
Steamboat Co., 261 Pa. 1, 6, 104 A. 60, 62 (1918).
89. 285 Pa. 561, 132 A. 810 (1926).

cluded the jury's use of present value tables.9" The plaintiff in McCaffrey brought suit in trespass to recover damages for injuries
sustained after defendant's car hit him. 9' The plaintiff based his

principal claim for damages on his loss of earning capacity resulting
from the dislocation of his right shoulder.9 2 The court refused to
admit the present worth tables for use by the jury, initially emphasizing that a man's earning capacity does not remain constant over the
years of his life. 93 Rather, the court stated that earning capacity
gradually declines as the years pass because of natural aging, and
may decline even further because of illnesses or "other causes" unrelated to the accident underlying the law suit.9 4 According to the

court, a jury must consider these factors in awarding future damages.9 5 The court also noted that the present value tables utilized by
previous juries, the same as those at issue in the case, showed the

present worth of an annuity, a constant periodic dollar amount payable at fixed dates in the future, without incorporating the age, illness,
and "other cause" factors.9 6 Given these initial findings, the court

determined that experience had shown it "impossible" to expect a
jury to use the present value tables and give proper attention to these
factors in rendering an accurate and just damage award for loss of
earning capacity. 97 Rather, the court found that present value tables
in the hands of the jury "almost inevitably tend[s] to their misuse, or,
in other words, to the direct application of them as though they were
annuity tables. . .. "'
In 1964, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again reversed itself
on the issue of the admissibility of present value annuity tables. In
Brodie v. Philadelphia Transportation Company,99 the plaintiff
90. Id at 572, 132 A. at 815.
91. Id at 565-66, 132 A. at 812.
92. Id at 566, 132 A. at 812.
93. Id at 570-71, 132 A. at 813.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id at 572, 132 A. at 813. Apparently, the court partially based its holding on its
perception of the general sophistication and ignorance of the jury in its inability to consider
the interplay of various factors together in reaching a conclusion. See id
98. 285 Pa. at 572, 132 A. at 814. In its analysis of the issue, the court summarily rejected
the proposition that present value tables aid the jury in making proper calculations. Id See
supra note 97 and accompanying text. Subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions
supported McCaffery as controlling precedent. See Schumacher v. Reading Transp. Co., 319
Pa. 254, 256, 178 A. 670, 671 (1935); Raskus v. Allegheny Valley St. Ry., 302 Pa. 34, 39, 153 A.
117, 118 (1930); Moore v. Leininger, 299 Pa. 380, 384, 149 A. 662, 663 (1930); Aylesworth v.
Hays, 299 Pa. 248, 249-50, 149 A. 495, 496 (1930).
In spite of AcCaffery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to instruct juries on the
present value concept by use of methods such as concrete illustrations. See McKinney v. Pittsburgh Rys., 363 Pa. 368, 370, 69 A.2d 93, 84 (1949); Littman v. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., 315 Pa.
370, 378, 172 A. 687, 691 (1934). Further, the Court held in Thirkell v. Equitable Gas Co., 307
Pa. 377, 161 A. 313 (1932) that courts can utilize the present value tables for the purpose of
evaluating the excessiveness of a verdict. Id at 382-83, 161 A. at 314.
99. 415 Pa. 296, 203 A.2d 657 (1964).

brought a negligence action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when the defendant's trolley car
struck the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding.1 o Justice
Eagen, writing for the court, expressly overruled McCaffrey 10 on the
damages issue, holding that juries could properly use present value
tables in computing the present value of damage awards for loss of
earning capacity.' °2 Justice Eagen initially cited the confusion and
conjecture often facing juries in the "involved process of reducing
future losses to their present worth."' 1 3 He then concluded that,
given the inherent difficulty of the present value concept, the jury
needs a tool with which it can "reduce the confusion and greatly
enhance the possibility of correct and just . . . [damage awards for
loss of future earnings]."'" Justice Eagen cautioned, however, that
present value tables do not constitute conclusive evidence, but rather
exist as an "aid" to assist the jury in arriving at the present value of
determined future damages. 10 5 He noted that because illness, accident, increased age, or other causes may curtail or cease his earnings,
a plaintiff's health, habits, and occupation are important factors for
jury consideration in its use of present value tables to determine the
present value of future damages." Thus, the rule favoring admissi100. Id at 298-99, 203 A.2d at 658.
101. For a discussion of McCaffrey, see supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
102. 415 Pa. at 302-03, 203 A.2d at 660. The court also held that in addition to present
value tables, the court may allow, in the alternative, the testimony of a qualified expert to
compose the proper present value computations for the jury. Id.
103. Id The court stated:
Trial judges and lawyers freely admit that the application of the "present worth
rule" is beyond the understanding and capabilities of most lay persons serving on
juries. In the very least, it is a tedious and laborious task. In some jurisdictions in the
United States, the courts simply ignore the rule as hopelessly difficult for the jury to
follow.
Id at 301-02, 203 A.2d at 659-60 (footnote omitted) (citing OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS
AND PROPERTY § 75 (1961)).
104. 415 Pa. at 302, 203 A.2d at 660. Justice Eagen indicated that affording juries a lool
with which to understand and apply the present value concept would result in fewer verdicts
based on "speculation and emotional reactions." Id He also reasoned that no logical reason
existed why competent proof should not establish a mathematical fact, such as the amount of
future damages, just as it establishes other relevant facts in a case. Id
105. Id Justice Eagen noted also that expert testimony on present value computation,; as
evidence is similarly inconclusive, the same qualifications applying. Id
106. Id The court held further that in survival actions the court should instruct the jury
that it must reduce a decedent's recovery for loss of future earnings by contributions he would
have made to provide for his wife, children and own maintenance during the period involved
before making any present value analysis of the damage award. Id at 303, 203 A.2d at 660.

For positions supporting jury use of the present value tables, see Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 545,
548, 421 A.2d 674, 681 (1980) (not inappropriate to submit reduction to present worth table to
jury); Prince v. Adams, 229 Pa. Super. 150, 154, 324 A.2d 358, 360 (1974) (actuarial tables
available to jury to aid in determination of present worth of damages).
In a fairly recent case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has apparently interpreted the
present value rule of Brodie to allow present value tables only when expert testimony is first
admitted on the present value issue. See Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R.R., 220 Pa. Super. 455,
458, 289 A.2d 166, 167 (1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in Gradel v. Inouye,
491 Pa. 545, 421 A.2d 674 (1980), that the present worth table submitted in that case to the jury
comprised part of the Pennsylvania Standard Instructions, Civil Subcommittee Draft of Octo-

bility of present worth tables remained the law in Pennsylvania until
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz. i07
D.

Pennsylvania's Current Rule of Lost Future EarningsKaczkowski v. Bolubasz.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently revised its analysis of the loss of future earning capacity as an element of damages in

personal injury cases by recognizing two factors that pervade the
American economy: inflation,' °8 and productivity. 0 9 In Kaczkowski

v. Bolubasz,"o Justice Nix, writing for the majority, held that "as a
matter of law. . . future inflation shall be presumed equal to future
interest rates with these factors offsetting,"'I and that upon proper

producfoundation, the courts shall consider the victim's lost future
1 2
earnings.
future
lost
for
damages
determining
in
tivity
ber 14, 1973, § 6.20: Civil Damages-Present Worth, and had been prepared and recommended by the Civil Instruction Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions. Id at 548 n.14, 421 A.2d at 681 n.14.
Federal circuit courts have split on the issue of present value tables. The Third Circuit
first held that in diversity jurisdiction cases arising under New Jersey substantive law, in order
to prevent sheer conjectural damage awards, the jury must receive evidence such as expert
testimony or present value tables or formulae to afford it mathematical guidance in reducing
future damages for loss of earning capacity to their present value. Russell v. City of Wildwood, 428 F.2d 1176, 1182-83 (3d Cir. 1970). The Third Circuit extended the Russell holding
thereafter to diversity jurisdiction cases arising under Pennsylvania substantive law. See Haddigan v. Harkins, 441 F.2d 844, 853 (3d Cir. 1970). Dissenting in Haddigan, Justice Aldisert
argued that no affirmative countervailing federal considerations existed to justify the majority's rule, which makes mandatory the introduction in diversity cases governed by Pennsylvania substantive law evidence that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Brodie determined
was only permissive. For a discussion of Brodie, see supra notes 99-106 and accompanying
text. The Third Circuit further extended the Russell holding to cases arising under the Federal
Employee Liability Act. See Ballantine v. Central R.R. of N.J., 460 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir.
1972).
In federal question cases arising under admiralty or F.E.L.A. jurisdiction, however, four
federal circuits have rejected the Russell holding, and concluded that expert testimony, or present value tables or formulae, are not an absolute prerequisite to the submission to the jury of
an instruction on lost future wages when plaintiff has presented evidence of such a loss. See
Bonura v. Sea Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974); Heater v. Chesapeake and
Ohio Ry., 497 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1974); Duncan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 480
F.2d 79, 87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973); Baynum v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry.,
456 F.2d 658, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania R.R. v. McKinley, 288 F.2d 262, 265 (6th
Cir. 1961).
107. 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980); see infra notes 118-54 and accompanying text.
108. Inflation is defined as "the increase in the volume of money and credit relative to
available goods resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level." Webster, Third International Dictionary (1965). Inflation gains are measured in terms of what the
average person refers to as "cost of living increases." Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561,
565 n.4, 421 A.2d 1027, 1029 n.4 (1980).
109. Productivity is defined as the "ability or capacity to product." Webster, Third International Dictionary (1965). The Supreme Court of Alaska recognized productivity implicitly
by stating that "[i]t is a matter of common experience that as one progresses in his chosen
occupation or profession he is likely to increase his earnings as the years pass by." Beaulieu v.
Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 672 (Alaska, 1967). Age, maturity, education and skill all affect productivity. Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 580, 421 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1980).
110. 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980).
I11. Id. at 583-84, 421 A.2d at 1038-39.
112. Id at 583-84, 421 A.2d at 1038. These two rules found support in what the court

Of the Pennsylvania appellate courts prior to Kaczkowski, only
the Pennsylvania Superior Court had addressed this issue. In Havens
v. Tonner, 13 the Superior Court held that evidence concerning a
"productivity factor" which reflects increases in an individual's future wages is inadmissible when calculating damages for loss of future earnings.1 I 4 Judge Van der Voort, writing for the court,

reasoned that neither inflation nor the "productivity factor" ' 15 was a
phenomenon so established or certain in the American economy to
warrant its recognition in future damage awards for loss of earnings.'l 6 Judge Van der Voort stated further that even if inflation

played a part in the economic pattern of the future, one "certain consequence" would find interest rates reflecting that fact by increasing
during inflationary periods." 7 Consequently, the court concluded

that a sum representing the present worth of future earnings would
earn more indollars in an inflationary period to compensate for inflation's effects." 8
In Kaczkowsk4 Justice Nix rejected the Havens holding and its
rationale." 9 He cited three considerations that the court felt mandated the rule formulated in the Kaczkowski decision. First, Justice

Nix found that "inflation and productivity factors are not speculative
and are capable of definition and prediction by economic extermed the "evidentiary" approach. Id at 575-76, 421 A.2d at 1035-36. For a more complete
discussion of these rules, see infra notes 124-47 and accompanying text. In adopting this approach, the court rejected two approaches adopted by other jurisdictions, the "traditional" and
"middle ground" approaches. 491 Pa. at 575-76, 421 A.2d at 1034-35. The "traditional" approach disregards the effects of future productivity and inflation as too speculative. Id at 575,
421 A.2d at 1034. Pennsylvania followed this approach prior to Kaczkowski. See infra notes
113-18 and accompanying text. The "middle ground" approach "permits the factflnder to
consider the effects of productivity and inflation on lost future earning capacity, but prohibits
expert testimony on either of these issues." 491 Pa. at 575, 421 A.2d at 1034. Justice Nix noted
that "the middle-ground approach contributes little to the accuracy or predictability of lost
future earnings, and paradoxically allows a judge or jury to determine what an acknowledge
[sic] expert cannot ... " Id at 576, 421 A.2d at 1035.
113. 243 Pa. Super. 371, 365 A.2d 1271 (1976).
114. Id at 377-78, 365 A.2d at 1274-75. Initially, the Havens court integrated inflation
and productivity into one factor which it called the "productivity factor." Id In its discussion
of this
"productivity factor," thecourt assumed that increased productivity, as evidenced by
steadily rising wage rates, was simply "one face of the coin of inflation." Id at 378, 365 A.2d
at 1274. The court bluntly stated: "We view the 'productivity factor' as simply a substitute for
inflation ... " Id
115. See supra note 114.
116. 243 Pa. Super. at 378, 365 A.2d at 1274. Judge Van der Voort stated:
It may be that inflation will become so much an established pattern of our economy
that it should be recognized in estimating loss of future earnings. Certainly the erratic behavior of the economy over the past half dozen years, plagued by war and
other unusual circumstances, is not a sufficient demonstration that inflation at any
predictable rate will continue for another twenty years.
Id
117. Id
118. Id The court added that "It]his [extra earning] may not wholly compensate for the
effect of inflation but it is a closer and more certain approximation than any assumption of a
certain rate of inflation over the next twenty years." Id
119. 491 Pa. at 570-74, 421 A.2d at 1032-34.

perts."' 12 He determined that the proven ability of economists to
harness economic trends, including inflation and productivity, and to
produce accurate economic forecasts, relied on by the government,
corporations, and financial institutions, provided a "reasonable basis
in fact" for considering inflation and productivity in damage awards
for loss of future earning capacity. ' 2' Second, Justice Nix found that
the courts, by refusing to recognize inflation and productivity in
damage awards, had breached their duty under Pennsylvania law to
attempt to reflect the exact extent of loss to the individual in the
damage amount. 22 Finally, the court found that numerous other
jurisdictions have adopted rules that consider inflation and
produc23
tivity integral factors in computing future loss earnings. 1
The Kaczkowski court adopted the "evidentiary approach" that
holds inflation and productivity factors admissible in determinations
of future damages for loss of earning capacity. 24 Justice Nix next
examined two variants of the evidentiary approach followed by two
other jurisdictions to formulate the specific legal rules under which
Pennsylvania courts would admit evidence of the inflation and productivity factors. Rather than adopt one variant to formulate the
legal rules for both the inflation and productivity factors, the court
selected rules from both variants for each factor.
1. Inflation.-In

dentiary approach,"'

125

selecting the rule for inflation under the "evi-

the choice included the "offset present value

method" adopted in Connecticut, 26 or Alaska's "total offset
' 27
method."'
Under the "offset present value method," the estimated inflation
rate is subtracted from the discount rate to calculate the inflationadjusted or "real" rate of interest.' 2 8 The court then discounts each
120. Id at 572, 421 A.2d at 1032-33.
121. Id, Justice Nix stated:
A court has a responsibility to the citizenry to keep abreast of changes in our society.
In light of the recognized acceptance of the science of economics, the courts of this
Commonwealth can no longer maintain their ostrich-like stance and deny the admissibility and relevancy of reliable economic data concerning the impact of productivity and inflation on lost future earnings. Indeed, to ignore economic realities and
presume that there will be no changes in an individual's future earnings because of
such factors is further removed from reality than any variance that may result from
our efforts to predict these factors.
Id at 572, 421 A.2d at 1033.
122. Id at 571, 421 A.2d at 1032. The court, in making this observation, weighed the
factor of accuracy in damage computations more heavily than the factors of predictability and
efficiency. The court perceived these latter factors as used in the past to justify nonrecognition
of inflation and productivity in damage awards. Id
123. Id at 575, 421 A.2d at 1034.
124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
126. See Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), af'dinpart,
524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
127. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
128. Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. at 577-78, 421 A.2d at 1035-36.

years earnings to present value by this "real" discount rate. 29
Under the "total offset method," a court does not discount the
damage award for loss of future earning capacity to its present
value. 30 Rather, it assumes that the effect of the future inflation rate
will completely offset the interest rate available on funds, thereby
eliminating
any need to discount the damage award to its present
3
value. ' '

' 32
The Kaczkowski court adopted the "total offset method."'
The court recognized the method's convenience 33 and relied on the
premise that "future inflation rates and future interest rates do not
exist in a vacuum, but co-vary significantly." ' 3 The court also observed that the "total offset method" obviously achieves the goals of
efficiency and predictability in damage award computations, 35 and
more satisfactorily achieves the goal of accuracy than would a
method which uses an inflation factor derived
from a periodic re36
evaluation of the volatile inflation rate.

2. Productivity.-In selecting the productivity-factor rule
under the evidentiary approach, 37 the court examined the Connecticut approach of Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines'3 8 and the Alaska approach outlined in Beaulieu v. Eliott. 131 Under Feldman,

Connecticut courts admit evidence indicating what course the individual's future employment potential would have taken but for the
personal injury preventing such potential. 40 Specifically, evidence
of the individual's education, employment history, work reputation,
129. Id
130. Id at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036.
131. Id
132. Id See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
133. As Justice Nix noted, "we choosse to adopt a damage formula which will allow for
[inflation] without actually requiring the factfinder to consider it as an independent element of
the award." 491 Pa. at 580, 421 A.2d at 1037.
134. Id. at 581, 421 A.2d at 1037 (citing Inflation. A Survey, 85 EcON. J. 741, 788 (1975)).
See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. Justice Nix also cited various economic commentators who support his premise as underlying the "total offset method." See 491 Pa. at
581, 421 A.2d at 1037-38.
135. 491 Pa. at 582, 421 A.2d at 1038. As the court noted "[litigators are freed from
introducing and verifying complex economic data. Judge and juries are not burdened with
complicated, time consuming economic testimony. Finally, by eliminating the variables of
inflation and future interest rates from the damage calculation, the ultimate award is more
predictable." Id at 583, 421 A.2d at 1038.
136. Id The court was apparently comparing the "total offset method" to the "offset
present value method," which uses an estimated inflation rate each time. See supra notes 12829 and accompanying text. In expressly comparing the two methods, Justice Nix noted that
the need to make difficult determinations of prospective interest rates over the work-expectancy period of the individual makes the "offset present value method" inferior. 491 Pa. at
582, 421 A.2d at 1038.
137. See supra note Il1 and accompanying text.
138. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), afdinpart,524
F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
139. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967).
140. 491 Pa. at 577, 421 A.2d at 1035 (discussing Feldman).

personal goals, and jobs for which the individual qualified before the
injury comes in to determine the incremental salary increases of the
decedent over his or her work-life expectancy.' 4' Under the Beaulieu approach, Alaska courts consider automatic step-wage increases
keyed to the individual's length of service on the job in arriving at
the individual's lost future earnings. 42 However, evidence of nonscheduled salary increases and bonuses granted to the individual as
he progresses in his occupation as a result of skill, experience, and
value to the employer is not admissible. 143
Justice Nix, for the court, adopted the Feldman approach because, in his opinion, it presents the trier of fact with all relevant
evidence capable of thorough evaluation, and from which it can
make an "informed estimation of the victim's lost earning capacity."'" The court further reasoned that although this approach may
consume time and involve a degree of speculation, "it is exceedingly
more accurate to assume that the future will not remain stagnant
with the past."'' 45 The court rejected the Beaulieu approach because
of its "limited" inquiry into only step-wage advances keyed to length
of job service, which effectively discriminate against individuals
whose salary depends upon their skill, experience, and value to their
employer.' 46 The court also noted that the Beaulieu approach, which
perceives merit-based increases as speculative, 4 7 represents a
"throwback" to the traditional approach of not considering inflation
or productivity at all in future damage awards for loss of earning
capacity and the court had previously rejected this approach earlier
in its opinion. 4 8
In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts sought to clarify the
court's holding on the productivity factor. 4 He did not perceive the
court's adoption of the Feldman approach 50 as novel because the
Feldman approach resembled the established Pennsylvania practice
of permitting juries to consider both the victim's earning increases
and15decreases in assessing future damages for loss of earning capacity. ' Second, Justice Roberts felt that the court's holding should
141. Id
142. Id at 578, 421 A.2d at 1036 (quoting State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530 (1976)). The court
noted earlier that Guinn "refined" Beaulieu. Id Under Guinn, the certainty and predictability
of this evidence at the time of trial provides the rationale for its admission. Id
.143. Id (quoting State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 546 (Alaska, 1976)). Guinn rejected the
evidence because of its speculativeness. Id
144. 491 Pa. at 579-80, 421 A.2d at 1036-37.
145. Id at 580, 421 A.2d at 1037.
146. Id
147. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
148. 491 Pa. at 580, 421 A.2d at 1037. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
149. 491 Pa. at 584-86, 421 A.2d at 1039-40 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts also
concurred with the court's rationale. Id
150. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
151. 491 Pa. at 584-85, 421 A.2d at 1039 (Roberts, J., concurring) (quoting Pennsylvania

not be interpreted as mandating juries to consider evidence of earning increases only, but rather as allowing juries to consider evidence

of both earning increases and decreases. 52 Finally, he reasoned that
the court's holding "does not represent the exclusive means of taking
future economic factors into account in cases of larger damage
awards covering losses over future years." 153 In support of this observation, Justice Roberts suggested the possibility of using, in addi-

tion to expert testimony,' 54 special findings of fact as evidence of the
probable track of individuals' future earnings. 155
E. Conclusion
Pennsylvania courts now apply the "total offset method" regarding the inflation aspect in awarding future lost earnings and
must accept appropriate evidence of increased productivity. This

approach moots all considerations of present value evidence or tables, and makes evidence on the issue irrelevant, unnecessary, and
inadmissible. Pennsylvania has locked the revolving door.

Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions Subcommittee Draft,
Civil Instruction § 6.22 (October 14, 1973) (citing McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 A.
810 (1926), overruled on other grounds, Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 415 Pa. 296, 203
A.2d 657 (1964); R. Bernstein, Damages in PersonalInjury and Death Cases in Pennsylvania, 23
PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 9 (1951)).
152. 491 Pa. at 585, 521 A.2d at 1039 (Roberts, J., concurring).
153. Id
154. The issue of evidence of plaintiff's productivity in Kaczkowski was presented in the
context of expert testimony, and not special findings of any facts. Id at 564, 421 A.2d at 1028.
155. Id at 585-86, 421 A.2d at 1039-40 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts noted
that these "may be helpful in making certain that neither the tortfeasor not [sic] the injured is
unduly prejudiced or benefited by future economic conditions." Id

